This work provides evidence that Subject Island violation effects vanish if subject-embedded gaps are made as frequent and pragmatically felicitous as non-island counterpart controls. We argue that Subject Island effects are caused by the fact that subject-embedded gaps are pragmatically unusual -as the informational focus does not usually correspond to a dependent of the subject phrase -and therefore are highly contrary to comprehenders' expectations about the distribution of filler-gap dependencies (Hofmeister et al
Introduction
Subject Islands are one of the strongest constraints on extraction. Whereas it is often possible to extract an NP from an NP complement, as in (1), extracting an NP from an NP subject as in (2) is generally regarded as impossible (e.g. Chomsky (1977, 106) , Kayne (1981, 114) , Huang (1982, 497) , Lasnik and Saito (1992, 42) , Nunes and Uriagereka (2000, 21) , Jackendoff (2002, 42) ). Indeed, whereas NP extractions from NP complements are well-attested in corpora as the sample in (3) taken from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008) illustrates, there are to our knowledge no English attestations of NP extraction from NP subjects whatsoever. 1 (3) a. (...) this was something James didn't seem to have [a problem with ] .
b. Others, we're going to have to find [some housing for ].
c. There was one last question my editor was dying to know [the answer to ].
A number of experimental studies have confirmed that Subject Island violations like those in (2) yield significantly lower acceptability ratings than uncontroversially grammatical controls (Sprouse, 2009; Goodall, 2011; Crawford, 2011; Clausen, 2011; Sprouse et al., 2015) , and although comprehenders are known to postulate gaps as soon as possible (Crain and Fodor, 1985; Frazier, 1987; Stowe, 1986; Stowe et al., 1991) -including inside NP objects like (1) (Tollan and Heller, 2016) there is no clear evidence that comprehenders actively postulate gaps inside NP subjects like those in (2) (Pickering et al., 1994; Stowe, 1986) .
Matters are made more complex by the fact that Subject Island effects can often be alleviated if the subject-embedded gap is 'parasitic' (Engdahl, 1983 ) on a second gap outside the island environment, as in (4) Not all Subject Islands can be avoided via parasitism, however. Subject-embedded gaps in tensed relative clauses like (6) are widely believed since Engdahl (1983) to be impossible to rescue via a secondary gap. The contrasts in (5) and (6) were experimentally validated by Kurtzman and Crawford (1991) and Phillips (2006) . (6) Phillips (2006) additionally provides evidence that comprehenders actively postulate gaps in subjectembedded infinitival environments like those in (5), but not in subject-embedded finite environments like those in (6) . From this, Phillips (2006, 808) concludes that the language parser does not postulate gaps in positions where no gap is licit, parasitic or otherwise, which in turn lends support to the view that Subject Island effects are due to grammatically illicit filler-gap dependencies, rather than to cognitive constraints or performance limitations.
It is sometimes unclear what can be concluded from a null effect, however, because an experiment can fail to detect an extant effect either because the methodology was not sensitive enough, or because of a design flaw. In the present paper we provide evidence that Phillips (2006) , Sprouse (2009) , Goodall (2011) , Crawford (2011) , and others have overstated the significance of their null effect findings. We show that subject-internal gaps can in fact become as acceptable as uncontroversially acceptable controls (Experiment 1) and are actively postulated during on-line sentence comprehension (Experiment 2), by simply increasing their frequency, provided that the propositions they express are highly felicitous to begin with. We then examine gaps that are claimed to be illicit even parasitically, such as tense-embedded gaps like those in (6b), and again find evidence suggesting that increased exposure can not only induce comprehenders to view such gaps as acceptable as uncontroversially acceptable controls (Experiment 3), but also to actively postulate such gaps during on-line sentence comprehension (Experiment 4). We argue that the simplest interpretation of the facts is that extraction from subjects is grammatically licit, but usually deemed unacceptable for two functional reasons: (i) they are strongly contrary to comprehenders' expectations about where gaps usually reside, a factor that can be mitigated with increased exposure; (ii) subject-internal gaps often -though not always -pragmatically presuppose very unusual discourse circumstances.
More specifically, we claim that if a proposition is highly felicitous then the mention of the referents therein are necessarily relevant as well. Consequently, such a proposition more naturally lends itself to subject internal gaps, simply because the mention of such subject-internal referents is relevant for the proposition. In such cases, repetition can more easily induce the amelioration of the island effect, or even alleviate it completely. Our work thus highlights the importance of making sure the items employed in experimental island research express equally highly felicitous propositions to begin with, independent of extraction, so that the effect caused by extraction can be better isolated from orthogonal stylistic, semantic and pragmatic differences. We conclude by arguing that Subject Island effects are epiphenomenal, and that linguistic theory need not be made more complex with constraints that block such filler-gap dependencies.
Two broad views of Subject Island phenomena
In this section we discuss two major opposing views of what Subject Island effects are and what they mean for linguistic theory, and discuss what we consider to be their strengths and weaknesses.
The architectural view
Mainstream generative grammar assumes that islands are due to the very architecture of the human language faculty. Thus, extraction from subjects has been argued to be impossible because of basic constraints on movement (Chomsky, 1995; Takahashi, 1994; Nunes and Uriagereka, 2000; Sabel, 2002; Boeckx, 2003; Nunes, 2004; Rackowski and Richards, 2005; Rizzi, 2007; Stepanov, 2007; Chomsky, 2008; Müller, 2011; Haegeman et al., 2014; Chesi and Bianchi, 2014) . Although no consensus yet exists about the exact nature of Subject Island effects, the architectural view has been claimed to be on the right track because of supporting psycholinguistic evidence: Phillips (2006) , Sprouse (2007) , Sprouse (2009) , Wagers and Phillips (2009) , Phillips et al. (2011) , Phillips (2013) , Sprouse et al. (2015) and others argue that Subject Island violations cannot be constructed by the language processor during language processing, or primed or ameliorated, as there are no mental representations to prime or ameliorate in the first place. As Sprouse (2007, 123) puts it: 'extra-grammatical factors that affect the acceptability -and are predicated on the existence of a representation -such as syntactic priming, should not affect the acceptability of ungrammatical sentences'.
The architectural view faces two kinds of potential challenges. First, Do and Kaiser (2017) shows that some Island violations can in fact be primed when the prime and the target were separated by only one sentence. 3 Second, whereas Sprouse (2009), and Crawford (2011) found no evidence that the acceptability of Subject Island violations increases by making such filler-gap dependencies more frequent, others have found clear amelioration effects (Hiramatsu, 2000; Clausen, 2011; Chaves and Dery, 2014) . 4 The fact that different experiments have arrived at different results suggests that the amelioration of Subject Island violations is highly sensitive to the particular experimental items and methodologies (Snyder, 2017) . On the other hand, no experiment has until now shown that Subject Island violations can become as acceptable as uncontroversially grammatical controls. Hofmeister et al. (2013) and Chaves (2013) more recently propose an alternative view in which Subject Island effects (and certain other phenomena) are instead due to probabilistic knowledge about the distribution of gaps: if the correct location of a gap is syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically highly unlikely in that particular utterance, then it is less likely for the sentence to be acceptable. For instance, if an object gap is strongly predicted in a given sentence context (given local cues and past experience with such constructions), a gap within a preceding complex subject would have low probability, making signs of a dependency inside the complex subject unlikely. This scenario leaves open the possibility that gaps within complex subjects can be predicted and posited, given sufficient cues that change the parser's expectations (Hofmeister et al., 2013, 49) .
The functional view
Indeed, there is good experimental evidence that speakers attend to probabilistic information about the syntactic distribution of filler-gap dependencies (van Schijndel et al., 2014) , and that gap predictability is crucial for on-line processing of islands (Michel, 2014) . More broadly, there is ample evidence that speakers attend and adapt to probabilistic information when processing a variety of linguistic input, including upcoming words (Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Arai and Keller, 2013; Creel et al., 2008; DeLong et al., 2005; Kutas and Hillyard, 1984) , lexical categories (Gibson, 2006; Levy and Keller, 2013; Tabor et al., 1997) , syntactic structures (Fine et al., , 2010 Farmer et al., 2014; Levy et al., 2012; Lau et al., 2006; Levy, 2008; Staub and Clifton, 2006) , semantics (Altmann and Kamide, 1999; Federmeier and Kutas, 1999; Kamide et al., 2003) , and pragmatics (Ni et al., 1996; Mak et al., 2008; Roland et al., 2012) . 5 In order to understand what can make a gap more plausible than another, we must briefly turn our attention to the function of filler-gap dependencies in general. Erteschik-Shir (1981) , Van Valin (1986) , Kuno (1987) , Takami (1992) , Deane (1992) , and Goldberg (2006, ch. 7) have argued that extraction is in general restricted to the informational focus of the proposition, i.e. to referents that are new or important in the sense that the speaker assumes the hearer cannot predict that they would be key participants in the given state of affairs. Perhaps the clearest example of the role of information focus in islands is the Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC) and its (non-)ATB exceptions, illustrated in (7).
(7) a.*This is the whiskey that Sam bought the beer and Robin spilled .
b. This is the whiskey that Sam bought and Robin spilled .
c. This is the whiskey that Sam went to the store and bought .
As Kehler (2002, ch.5) demonstrates, the CSC and its ATB exceptions follow from whether there is a parallel discourse coherence relationship between the conjuncts (7a,b), and non-ATB exceptions follow from whether the information focus is established only with reference to one of the conjuncts, as in (7c). For further empirical evidence that the CSC is pragmatic see Kubota and Lee (2015) . The Complex NP Constraint (CNPC) is another type of island that is arguably constrained in very much the same way, since the only known acceptable exceptions to the CNPC 5 The role of pragmatic expectations in language processing is demonstrated by Mak et al. (2008) and Roland et al. (2012) , which show that the well-known processing advantage of subject relatives over object relatives is partly due to the differing degrees to which subject and object relative clauses violate more discourse expectations when encountered in isolated contexts, typical of experimental stimuli. Corpora evidence shows that the embedded noun phrase in object relative clauses nearly always has a discourse-old referent, even if the noun phrase is not pronominal, while the referent of the embedded noun phrase in subject relative clauses is typically discourse-new. Roland et al. (2012) found that noun phrase object relative clauses are not more difficult to process than subject relatives if preceded by appropriate discourse contexts.
involve relative clauses that express new information rather than backgrounded information; see Erteschik-Shir and Lappin (1979) , Kuno (1987) , Deane (1992) , and Goldberg (2013) . This is illustrated by the relative clauses in (8), which express assertions and therefore easily contain the information focus. (8) (Pollard and Sag, 1994, 206) Now, given that subject phrases are typically reserved for topic continuity rather than for introducing new referents (Chafe, 1994; Kuno, 1972; Lambrecht, 1994; Bayer and Salzmann, 2013) , it follows that subjects are more likely to be pronominal or elliptical than objects, and that extraction from English subject phrases is difficult because the information focus is unlikely to reside in the subject. 6 Crucially, whether a subject-internal referent can be the informational focus or not, is a matter of degree, and more likely in some propositions than in others. For example, classic Subject Island violations like *Which rebel leader did the rivals of shoot Castro? are arguably unacceptable because out-of-the-blue it is unclear why the rebel leader is worthy of mention in the proposition The rivals of a rebel leader shot Castro. Without a suitable context, the rebel leader has no obvious bearing on the assertion that people shot Castro. As Kluender (2004, 495) insightfully noted: 'Subject Island effects seem to be weaker when the wh-phrase maintains a pragmatic association not only with the gap, but also with the main clause predicate, such that the fillergap dependency into the subject position is construed as of some relevance to the main assertion of the sentence'. 7 Indeed, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging evidence from Matchin et al. (2018) suggests that Subject island effects activate networks involved in conceptual-semantic processing, as expected in the present account.
In our view, the items employed by previous Subject Island experiments tend to fail this pragmatic constraint. Consider for example What does John know that a bottle of fell on the floor? from Snyder (2000) . Out of the blue, there is no clear a priori reason for why the content of a bottle is important for the fact that John knows that a bottle fell on the floor. This kind of problem can be avoided using suitable contextualizations or experimental items normed to be as plausible as nonisland controls, i.e. items that have highly felicitous declarative counterparts. No prior research on islands has normed items in this way, to our knowledge.
Although it is not easy to construct sentences where a dependent of the subject can be easily deemed as the informational focus, it is by no means impossible. The key to achieving this is to make sure that in the declarative form of the utterance all the referents in the sentence (especially those embedded in the subject phrase) are highly relevant for the overall proposition. For instance, 6 Michaelis and Francis (2007) found a bias in the distribution of lexical versus pronominal subjects in the Switchboard corpus (Marcus et al., 1993 (Chaves, 2012) b. What did [the attempt to find ] end in failure? (Hofmeister and Sag, 2010, 370) We know of no empirical reason for assuming that such extractions are syntactically different from standard Subject Island violations. See Chomsky (2008 , 160,ft.39), Jiménez-Fernández (2009 , Chaves (2013) , and Haegeman et al. (2014) for more examples of acceptable English extractions from a variety of subject phrases, including from transitive constructions. The functional account also explains why a subject-embedded gap usually becomes more acceptable in the presence of a second non-island gap: since the two gaps are co-indexed, then the fronted referent is trivially relevant for the main assertion, as it is predicated by the main verb. For example, the low acceptability of (10a) is arguably caused by the lack of plausibility of the described proposition: without further contextual information, it is unclear how the attempt to repair an unspecified thing x is connected to the attempt causing damage to a car. (Phillips, 2006) Our informants report that (10a) becomes more acceptable if it is contextually established that x is a component of the car. In contrast, (10b) is felicitous even out-of-the-blue because it conveys a proposition that is readily recognized as being plausible according to world knowledge: attempting to fix x can cause damage to x. If Subject Island effects are indeed contingent on how relevant the extracted subject-embedded referent is for the assertion expressed by the proposition, then a wide range of acceptable patterns is to be expected, parasitic or otherwise. This includes cases like (11), where both gaps are in Subject Island environments. As Levine and Sag (2003) , Hukari (2006, 256), and Culicover (2013, 161) note, cases like (11) should be completely unacceptable, contrary to fact. The conclusion that Subject Island effects are contingent on the particular proposition expressed by the utterance thus seems unavoidable.
(11) This is a man who [friends of ] think that [enemies of ] are everywhere.
Further corroborating evidence for the role of pragmatics in extractions from subject phrases comes from the fact that all Subject Island violations attested in corpora that we are aware of involve relative clauses that describe new information rather than background information, underlined in (12). For example, (12a) asserts that 'five of their eight children are still living at home', rather than merely asserting that 'they have eight children'. For more about relative clauses that express assertions rather than background information see Menn (1974) , McCawley (1981) , Lambrecht (1988), and Lambrecht (2000) . (12) (Huddleston et al., 2002 (Huddleston et al., , 1093 (Huddleston et al., ,1094 f. In his bedroom, [which] [to describe as small] would be a gross understatement], he has an audio studio setup. (Chaves, 2013) In addition to being attested in corpora, Abeillé et al. (2018) provide experimental evidence that extractions like (12) are in fact acceptable. 8 Finally, note that Kluender and Kutas (1993) and Van Valin (1995) point out that PP extractions in general have an additional advantage over NP extractions in that the grammatical function of the extracted phrase is clearer from the onset: the presence of the preposition leads to fewer potential gap sites that are consistent with the extracted constituent, especially when the filler-gap dependency is short as in (12). All of the above evidence is consistent with the proposal in Hofmeister et al. (2013) and Chaves (2013) that the more syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically plausible the subject-internal gap, the more acceptable such extractions should be, especially if comprehenders have the chance to adjust to the unusual syntactic location of the gap by being exposed to multiple exemplars of 8 Also attested in relatives that do not express background information are in situ subject-embedded wh-phrases, as illustrated by the suppletive relative in (i) and (ii) from COCA and Google Books. Such constructions are formal in style, but not very rare. Abeillé et al. (2018) such sentences. We argue that such amelioration should be facilitated when the very mention of the subject-embedded referent is a highly felicitous discourse move to begin with. For the mention of any given referent to be felicitous and in accordance to the Gricean Maxims of Quantity ('Be brief') and Manner ('Avoid Prolixity'), the context must be such that the referent is not irrelevant for the proposition. In addition, for a referent to be extractable it must not only be relevant for the proposition, it must in addition play a pivotal role in it, as the informational focus. Hence, the more pragmatically felicitous the mention of a given referent is (subject-embedded or not) the more easily it can be deemed the informational focus, and the more felicitous the extraction. Because subjects tend to be topics, it follows that subject-embedded referents must be rarer than object-embedded referents. Using Tregex (Levy and Andrew, 2006) , we have confirmed that NPs consisting of a nominal head followed by a PP occur about twice as often immediately after the verb (as objects) than immediately before the verb (as subjects) in the Wall Street Journal corpus (16159 occurrences vs. 8426), Brown corpus (4667 occurrences vs. 2222), and Switchboard corpus (1595 occurrences vs. 890). Of course, other languages may deploy different pragmatic biases, and regard subject-embedded referents as more likely informational foci than English does, potentially explaining at least some of the cross-linguistic variation in Subject Island effects surveyed in Stepanov (2007) . 9 The experiments we describe below collectively suggest that ensuring that a proposition with subject-embedded referents is highly felicitous is sufficient to allow the extractability of such subject-embedded referents when their frequency is increased. More specifically, Experiment 1 shows that sentences with subject-embedded gaps and sentences with object-embedded gaps that express essentially the same (highly felicitous) propositions rapidly become equally acceptable, within as much as 8 exposures. Experiment 2 offers supporting online evidence for the very same effect of adaptation to sentences with subject-embedded gaps in a self-paced reading task. In Experiments 3 and 4 we show that the similar effects arise in more extreme Subject Islands that are embedded in tensed relatives, which are allegedly impossible to ameliorate parasitically or otherwise. Our results are consistent with the functional view, but not with the architectural view. As a consequence, we argue that pragmatics and probabilistic knowledge must be taken into consideration in experimental research about filler-gap dependencies, if a explanatory and comprehensive account of island effects is to be reached.
Experiment 1: Extraction from simple subjects
The paradigm in (4), repeated below in (13), is traditionally assumed since Engdahl (1983) to show that subject-internal gaps are licit only if they are parasitic on a non-island gap. We reject this conclusion for two reasons. First, many authors such as Kuno and Takami (1993) , Pollard and Sag (1994, 195,ft.32), Culicover (1999, 230) , Levine et al. (2001, 204) , Levine and Sag (2003, 252, ft.6) and others have noted that some Subject Island violations are rather acceptable, like those in (9) Second, and more importantly for the present work, (13a) and (13b) express very different propositions and have different pragmatic requirements, and therefore there is no a priori reason to expect that (13a) and (13b) should receive identical acceptability judgements. The contexts in which (13a) is felicitous are stricter than those of (13b) because the pragmatic status of subjects is different from that of objects, as already discussed in §2.2. Thus, it is unclear what conclusions can legitimately be drawn from comparing sentences like (13a,b). Rather, we argue that it is far more appropriate to compare the acceptability of near-truth-conditionally equivalent sentence pairs such as (15), where the order of the subject and the object can be switched without a radical difference in truth-conditions because the verb is a symmetric predicate. In Experiment 1 below we show that although the acceptability (15b) starts out as much lower than (15a), after about 8 exposures the former has become as acceptable as the latter. Crucially, no such radical and sharp amelioration occurs with uncontroversially ungrammatical controls.
Method

Participants
We analyzed data provided by 74 participants with IP addresses originating from the United States that were recruited through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (AMT) crowdsourcing marketplace. For evidence that sentence acceptability data obtained via AMT parallel data obtained in the laboratory see Munro et al. (2010) , Gibson et al. (2011 ), Melnick et al. (2011 ), and Sprouse (2011 . All self-reported as native speakers of English, and had accuracy levels of at least 85% in comprehension questions, with a mean accuracy level of 90%.
Design and materials
We constructed 22 experimental items, each of which had two versions, as shown in (16). Every item involved a symmetric predicate. The location of the gap is made explicit below, though no such indication was made in the actual stimuli. See Appendix A for a complete list. 10 (16) a. Which committee does the report of supposedly contradict the recommendations of the experts? (subject condition)
b. Which committee does the report of the experts supposedly contradict the recommendations of ? (object condition)
To ensure that the subject and object conditions of our 22 experimental items expressed equally plausible propositions, we conducted a norming task over the declarative counterparts of the items. For example, the sentence pair in (16) was converted into The report of this committee supposedly contradicts the recommendations of the experts and The report of the experts supposedly contradicts the recommendations of this committee, respectively, and participants were asked to rate the plausibility of the sentences. This plausibility norming stage ensures that the propositions described by the items are equally highly felicitous to begin with. Hence, any difference in acceptability must come from extraction itself, not from other sources independent from extraction. A group of 100 participants recruited through AMT were asked to rate the plausibility of these declarative counterparts of our items using a 1 -7 Likert scale. An overall t-test revealed that the plausibility of subject and object conditions did not differ, t = −0.9, p = 0.366. We also conducted pairwise t-tests on the responses for the subject and object conditions of each experimental item pair. These tests revealed that only two pairs exhibited a statistically significant difference in plausibility, but the remaining 20 pairs did not (all ps > 0.05). We nevertheless used all 22 pairs in the experiment, and included their plausibility ratings as an additional predictor in our analysis. In doing so, any difference attributable to the location of the gap will not be confounded by differences in plausibility which vary individually across experimental items.
Items were counterbalanced across two lists using a Latin Square design so that each participant only responded to one version of each experimental item. Experimental items were interspersed among 44 distractor items, pseudorandomized so that different participants saw items in different orders. A sample of the distractors is seen in (17) and (18), which were either object gaps or subject gaps, some of which were clause-embedded. Half of the distractors were ungrammatical, as in (18). (17) c.*Which boat does the report unexpectedly reveal that the soldiers were thinking?
The ungrammatical distractors were relatively homogeneous, and therefore can be taken to function as additional controls: they all consisted of which interrogatives with an adverb and a clauseembedded gap. The source of oddness always involved an incorrect word in the embedded VP.
Procedure
Participants were asked to judge how natural each sentence was, by giving it a rating from 1 (very unnatural) to 7 (very natural). In order to ensure that comprehenders were attending to the structure and meaning of the experimental items, half of the grammatical distractors were immediately followed by a (nontrivial) True/False question; e.g. (17c) was followed by (19).
(19) The judge presiding over the trial was claimed to have no concerns about the jury. [True/False] 
Results
The mean response for the Subject condition was 3.99 (SD = 1.69), and for the Object condition 5.08 (SD = 1.51), confirming the existence of an island effect. The mean response for the grammatical distractors was 5.7 (SD = 1.46), and 2.67 (SD = 1.59) for the ungrammatical distractors. 11 An LMER model with gap location, presentation order, plausibility, and all possible interactions between the three factors as fixed factors revealed a main effect of gap location in which subject gaps were rated lower than object gaps (β = −1.065, t = −7.69, p < 0.0001), and a significant interaction between gap location and presentation order, suggesting that the the acceptability of subject and object items changed differently during the experiment (β = 0.061, t = 5.23, p < 0.0001). No significant effect of plausibility was found, nor of interactions. Since no two participants saw the items in the same order, the changes in acceptability cannot be due to any particular item order.
Simple effects analyses were conducted separately on each gap location condition by conducting LMER models with presentation order as fixed predictors. Presentation order was not significant for the object gap condition (β = 0.004, t = 0.58, p = 0.56), and highly significant for the subject gap condition (β = 0.065, t = 7.84, p < 0.0001), even in models that include plausibility as a (non-significant) predictor. Separate models revealed that while the acceptability of the ungrammatical distractors did not increase during the experiment (β = −0.003, t = 1.41, p = 0.24), that of the grammatical distractors did (β = 0.005, t = 1.98, p = 0.04). Figure 1 shows regression lines for all conditions and distractors, with 95% confidence intervals. Each point corresponds to the average acceptability rating for items in the given order of representation. Since no two participants saw the experimental items in the same order, each point corresponds to the average rating that different participants gave to different items in the given order as the experiment progressed. Recall that in this experiment each participant read 11 subject island violations, and 11 object counterparts. We can therefore use the interaction estimate between the subject gap condition and presentation order to predict when the acceptability difference between subject gap items and object difference will disappear: ≈ 17 presentations (i.e. -1.06/0.061 = subject gap coefficient / interaction coefficient). In other words, the model suggests that if the experiment had been 5 items longer then the acceptability of the Object and Subject items would completely overlap, assuming the acceptability increase is linear. In fact, a post-hoc analysis already suggests that the acceptability of the subject items became as high as the acceptability of the object items in a subset of the data consisting of the last four presentation orders (144 responses). There, the mean acceptability was 4.48 (SD = 1.62) for subject condition items, and 5.03 (SD = 1.55) for object condition items. An LMER model was run on this subset of data, with gap location as a fixed predictor, and found no significant difference between the two conditions (β = −0.55, t = −1.68, p = 0.1). The plots in Figure 2 illustrate the overlap between Subject item ratings at the end of the experiment with Object item ratings at the end of the experiment. Focusing on a smaller window consisting of the last two presentation orders, the mean acceptability was 4.41 (SD = 1.57) for subject condition items, and 4.92 (SD = 1.71) for object condition items (96 responses). An LMER model ran on this subset of data with gap location as a fixed predictor found it to not be significant (β = −0.39, t = −1.26, p = 0.21). By selecting only these late presentations we have reduced the sample size considerably, and therefore raised the odds of not finding a significant difference even though one may exist. This problem can be mitigated by using robust statistics, such as bootstrapping (Wilcox, 2005; Larson-Hall and Herrington, 2010) . Accordingly, we sampled with replacement from the 96 total data points (48 per condition) to create 1056 data points (528 per condition). This process was repeated a total of 100 times, and for each upsampled dataset we ran an LMER model with gap location as a fixed predictor, allowing the random effects to have different slopes for the main factor. We again found no significant difference between subject and object conditions (mean t = −0.95, SD = 0.01).
Finally, we compared the acceptability of subject condition items seen towards the end of the experiment with the acceptability of object condition items at the beginning of the experiment. If Subject Island effects are as strong as standardly assumed, and due to the architecture of the language faculty, then repeated exposure should not cause Subject Island violations to be as acceptable as the 'first-impression' acceptability ratings of grammatical controls. After all, linguists routinely collect 'first-impression' judgements, and deem those reliable. Thus, a different subset of data was formed containing 78 responses for subject items with presentation order of 20 or higher (mean response 4.41; SD = 1.66), and 78 responses for object items with presentation order of 3 or lower (mean response 4.75; SD = 1.68). An LMER model with gap location as a fixed predictor revealed that gap location was again not significant (β = −0.29, t = −1.35, p = 0.17).
Our findings indicate that the acceptability of subject items became indistinguishable from the acceptability of object items. A replication of this experiment without comprehension questions yielded the same overall results.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that the acceptability contrast between extracting from NP complements and extracting from NP subjects vanishes if the underlying propositions are equally plausible, and comprehenders are exposed to the two types of extraction in equal and sufficient amounts (at least 8 exposures). This result shows how extreme the amelioration caused by repeated exposure can be.
The fact that the acceptability of the grammatical distractors also increased is unremarkable, since there is no reason to assume that acceptability judgements of grammatical sentences should be constant. If such structures are sufficiently complex, stylistically marked, or unexpected in some way it is likely that comprehenders initially experience difficulty parsing such sentences but gradually become more proficient at it with repeated exposure. As Fine et al. ( , 2010 Farmer et al. (2014) ; show for garden-path sentences, comprehenders can quickly adapt to overcome unusual grammatical structures. Moreover, the fact that the grammatical controls were rated higher than the Object condition items is also unremarkable, as there is no reason for structurally different grammatical sentences expressing different propositions to have identical acceptability ratings; see for example Keller (2003) , Luka and Barsalou (2005) , and Lau et al. (2015) for independent evidence that sentence acceptability is correlated with sentence probability.
There are three possible interpretations for our findings. One is that Subject Island violations are ungrammatical but somehow can be deemed as acceptable as uncontroversially ungrammatical sentences, as 'grammatical illusions'. 12 We find such a view implausible given that the naive native speakers we have consulted over the years have no problem providing an appropriate context for Subject Island violations like those in (20), which they deem as completely acceptable. There is no reason to believe there is anything illicit about such sentences, nor that they are structurally special. Moreover, what would make comprehenders start hallucinating only after a number of exposures?
It is unclear what the underlying mechanism would be. If data like (20) and our experimental findings are nothing but 'grammatical illusions' then there is no guarantee, for example, that parasitic gaps embedded in infinitival subjects which Phillips (2006, 808) found to be acceptable are in fact grammatical. More generally, in the absence of a clear criterion to distinguish true from illusionary grammaticality, it becomes impossible to objectively determine whether any (un)acceptable sentence is in fact (un)grammatical or not. An alternative interpretation is one where Subject Islands start out as ungrammatical, but somehow become grammatical (e.g. perhaps due to the change of a microparameter for subject subextraction out of certain verbal structures). If so, our results would speak against the architectural approach because they are inconsistent with constraints on extraction being intrinsic properties of the language faculty. However, such an account flies in the face of the fact that some Subject Island violations like (20) are quite acceptable, even without repetition. Of course, any model can always be made more complex in order to account for additional facts. The question is whether such an extension is independently motivated or not. We are unaware of any configurational account that is consistent with the full range of empirical and behavioral facts.
The simplest interpretation, in our view, is one where Subject Island violations are simply not architecturally illicit. Their oddness, whenever any exists, is due to the subject-internal gap being unlikely, and contrary to comprehenders' prior expectations about the distribution of filler-gap dependencies. In this view, it is unnecessary to complicate theories of grammar with syntactic constraints that prevent extraction from subjects, as there are no such constraints. As already discussed in §2.2, subject phrases are typically reserved for topic continuity rather than for introducing new referents, and therefore are much less likely to involve the informational focus. Hence, it is pragmatically unlikely for sentences to contain subject-embedded gaps, simply because extraction targets the informational focus, not the topic.
Another, perhaps related factor that may further preempt speakers from considering the possibility of subject-embedded gaps is that sentences with complex subjects are harder to process than sentences with complex complements, even in the absence of extraction (Kynette and Kemper, 1986; Clark and Wasow, 1998; Ferreira, 1991; Tsiamtsiouris and Cairns, 2009; Amy and Noziet, 1978; Eady and Fodor, 1981) , and that more cognitive effort is required in order to process unexpected input (Boston et al., 2008; Demberg and Keller, 2008; Roark et al., 2009; Smith and Levy, 2008) , especially at the beginning of the utterance (Petten and Kutas, 1990) . Matters are made worse by the fact that processing long-distance dependencies is cognitively costly (Chen et al., 2005; Frazier, 1987; Pickering and Barry, 1991; Kluender, 1998; Wanner and Maratsos, 1978; Phillips et al., 2005; Sussman and Sedivy, 2003; Gibson, 2002, 2005) . The net effect of all these pragmatic and cognitive pressures is that speakers may simply prefer to avoid positing subject-embedded gaps, causing them to be extremely rare, though not grammatically impossible.
But by increasing the frequency of such constructions comprehenders can adapt and revise their expectations about the plausibility of subject internal gaps, all else being equal. For a maximum entropy model consistent with the linear increase of acceptability in the presence of increased exposure see Chaves (2018) .
Experiment 2: Gap-filling inside simple subjects
The previous off-line experiment suggests that Subject Island effects are influenced by the probability of the input. In the next experiment we provide on-line sentence processing evidence that Subject Island effects are sensitive to the probabilities of the input. Together, the two experiments suggest that the functional view is superior to the architectural view.
It is well known that comprehenders postulate gaps and attempt to fill them as soon as possible (Crain and Fodor, 1985; Frazier, 1987; Stowe, 1986; Stowe et al., 1991) , but such an effect has not been systematically observed inside subject phrases. For example, Stowe (1986) and Experiment 2 of Pickering et al. (1994) probed sentences like (21), and found no slowdown in reading time at the regions in bold, suggesting that comprehenders do not postulate subject-internal gaps. Although these null effects would seem to support the view that subject-internal gaps are not postulated during sentence comprehension because they are not grammatical, such a view is inconsistent with the fact that subject-internal gaps are licit, at least parasitically, as in (4b) and (5b) above.
Crucially, the experiments in Stowe (1986) and Pickering et al. (1994) did not contain any items with subject-embedded gaps, but given that probabilistic knowledge influences active gap-filling (van Schijndel et al., 2014; Michel, 2014) , then including such gaps in the experimental items might make their postulation more likely. Experiment 2 below confirms this.
Method
Participants
We analyzed data provided by 41 participants who were recruited in AMT, using recruitment protocols identical to Experiment 1. All had accuracy levels of at least 80% in comprehension questions, with a mean accuracy level of 87%. There were 15 additional participants whose accuracy scores were lower than the 80% threshold, as well as 20 additional participants who participated in similar experiments in the past. Data collected from these participants were discarded.
Design and materials
A between-subject block design was employed to investigate whether gap-filling inside subject phrases is contingent on the probability of such gaps. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, which we will call the Subject group and the Object group. In both groups, participants were exposed to two blocks of sentences, reading a total of 45 sentences in the first block, and 30 sentences in the second block. Participants in the Subject group read 15 Subject Island violation sentences and 30 distractor sentences in the first block, while participants in the Object group read 45 distractors in the first block. The second block was identical for both groups, and contained 10 Subject Island 'violation' sentences and 20 distractors. (22) The adverb (region 4) is consistent with a gap-less parse because adverbs can modify an upcoming NP (e.g. in attested examples like the infants of reportedly non-smoking mothers, or in the execution of allegedly innocent people). It is the main verb region (region 5) that is incompatible with a gapless parse.
A sample of distractors is in (23). There were three types in each of the three blocks: object extractions like (23a,b), where the gap is in a complement phrase instead of the subject, adverbial extractions like (23c), where the gap is an adverb that modifies the main verb, and matrix subject interrogatives like (23d), where the wh-phrase immediately precedes the verb that selects it. Some distractors contain the preposition of in the subject, others in the object, others none at all. 
Procedure
Participants read sentences on a self-paced moving window display (Just et al., 1982) . Programming and presentation of the experimental stimuli was done using Ibex 0.3.9 (Drummond, 2013) . See Futrell (2012, 25-35) for validation studies showing that Ibex self-paced reading experiments with AMT participants can replicate classic self-paced reading experiments run in the laboratory. See also Enochson and Culbertson (2015) for an AMT self-paced reading validation study of the classic filler-gap experiment by Wanner and Maratsos (1978) .
Each trial began by presenting a sequence of dashes representing the non-space characters in the sentences. Pressing the space bar caused the dashes corresponding to the first region to be replaced by words. Subsequent presses revealed subsequent regions, while the previous region reverted to dashes. Reading times between each pair of button presses were recorded. The comprehension question that was presented after half of the distractor items had only two possible answers, yes or no, which appeared in random order. The responses to the comprehension questions were recorded, and participants were informed of any incorrect answers. Participants completed four practice trials at the beginning of the experiment to familiarize themselves with the task. The experiment immediately followed the practice trials. Presentation of sentences was quasi-randomized within blocks, the structure of which was entirely implicit (i.e. from the participants' perspective, 75 sentences were shown one at a time, without breaks or any explicit indication of the block structure of the experiment).
Results
For each region of interest, we excluded reading times that were less than 100 ms and more than 1,500 ms long, and replaced data points that were greater or less than 2.5 standard deviations from each participant's mean with these boundary values. We then computed residual reading times by subtracting from the actual reading time for a region the reading time predicted by a regression equation relating region length to reading time (Trueswell and Tanenhaus, 1994) . This regression equation was computed separately for each participant, using all regions in the experimental and distractor items. Residual reading times for all sentence regions were analyzed using an LMER model to test whether reading times of sentences with Subject Island violations in Block 2 was affected by the sentences in Block 1. Figure 3 shows mean residual reading times, where bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Region 5 exhibited a significant effect (β = 86.80, t = 2.07, p = 0.04), suggesting that participants in the Subject group (i.e. who saw 15 Subject Island violation sentences in Block 1) read the region of interest of the Subject Island violations in Block 2 faster than participants in the Object group (i.e. who saw zero Subject Island violation sentences in Block 1). No region before region 5 exhibited a significant effect.
Discussion
Since the only difference between the two groups of participants consisted of whether there were Subject Island violations in the Block 1 of items, the observed difference in reading times can only be attributed to that difference. The reading time differences appear after the critical region (the gap site), suggesting that comprehenders that were not trained to process Subject Island violations had more difficulty processing such sentence regions. The fact that the participants in the Subject group processed the critical region faster than those in the Object group is consistent with the view that the former comprehenders adjusted their expectations about subject-embedded gaps during their exposure to Block 1, and therefore were less surprised by such gaps in Block 2 than the participants in the Object group. In sum, our results are consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, in that Subject Island effects are sensitive to the probability of the input. Together, the two experiments suggest that extraction from subjects is in principle construable by the parser, and their processing and acceptability is sensitive to their (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) probability.
Experiment 3: Parasitic extraction from tensed subjects
Perhaps it can be argued that subject-internal gaps like the ones examined so far are postulated during on-line sentence processing because they can in principle be made licit if parasitic on a second gap. After all, such gaps are not necessarily illicit because they can still potentially be 'rescued' later in the sentence, if there is another gap downstream. In what follows we consider tense-embedded Subject Island violations because they are widely claimed to disallow any kind of amelioration, parasitic or otherwise. For example, although a subject-embedded gap in an infinitival phrase like (24a) can be made licit if parasitic on a second gap as in (24b), subject-embedded gaps in tensed phrases like (25a) remain illicit even in the presence of a second gap, as in (25b). Such contrast have been experimentally validated by Kurtzman and Crawford (1991) , and Phillips (2006) . (24) Interestingly, Phillips (2006) found that the acceptability of (25a) is significantly lower than that of (25b), even though the parasitic gap is (allegedly) illicit. This presents a puzzle for the architectural view because if the subject-embedded gap is ungrammatical and beyond parasitic rescue, then (25a,b) should be equally unacceptable. But in the functional view expounded in §2.2 extractions like (25a) are expected to be worse than (25b) because in the former case the extracted referent is predicated by the main verb, a canonical informational focus domain. Furthermore, both (25a,b) are expected to be odd if in these particular propositions the odds of the extracted referent what being the patient of repaired happen to be particularly low. This would predict that ideal conditions the presence of tense should not hamper extraction so severely, as in counterexamples like (26). 13 (26) a. Here is [the boy who everyone who has met ] thinks is clever.
(attributed to Janet Fodor by Engdahl (1983)) b. She is [the kind of person that everyone who meets ] ends up falling in love with . (Kayne, 1983) c. John is [someone who everyone who meets ] dislikes . (Culicover, 1999, 179) d. Which woman do [men who meet ] usually ask out ? (attributed to Elisabet Engdahl by Pollard and Sag (1994, 226)) e. This is [a bill that the senators who objected to ] would probably not benefit from . (Chaves and Dery, 2014) To be sure, none of the sentences in (26) are easy to process, or regarded as unquestionably acceptable by all speakers, and so the grammatical status of such parasitic gaps remains somewhat unclear. Although tensed-embedded Subject Island gaps like (25a,b) should never be licit and should never be postulated during on-line sentence processing according to Phillips (2006) , we show below that such subject-embedded gaps can become as acceptable as undisputedly grammatical controls (Experiment 3) and are actively postulated during on-line sentence processing (Experiment 4), employing the same experimental paradigms as Phillips (2006) . Experiment 3 probes items like (26d,e) and shows that although they initially receive very low acceptability ratings, they quickly improve to the point of being as acceptable as uncontroversially grammatical controls. This sharp amelioration effect should be impossible if such gaps are grammatically and computationally illicit, as explicitly assumed by Phillips (2006, 803) and others. In this study we compare the acceptability of three types of sentences, illustrated in (27). The Parasitic gap items contain one gap embedded in a tensed relative inside the subject, and another gap in the complement the main verb. The Object gap items contain exactly one gap, corresponding to the main verb's object. In order to provide a baseline for low-acceptability items, we included in the experiment Non-parasitic gap items, which contain a gap located inside the tensed relative in the subject phrase, but no second gap. 
Method
Participants
We analyzed data provided by 135 participants who were recruited via AMT, using recruitment protocols identical to Experiment 1. There were 22 additional participants who reported they were not native speakers of English. Data collected from these participants were discarded.
Design and materials
There were 24 experimental items, and three versions of each experimental item as illustrated in (27) . The full list is in Appendix C. The 24 experimental item triples were counterbalanced across three lists using a Latin Square design so that each participant only responded to one version of each experimental item, and were interspersed among 36 distractor items. The distractors are illustrated in (28), half of which were ungrammatical, as shown in (29). Exactly as in previous experiments, all items were pseudorandomized and interspersed with distractors.
(28) a. Which computer did the technician regard as being difficult to find parts for?
b. Which window did the previous tenant request that the insurance company fix?
c. Which machine did the regional managers ask if the employees wanted to get rid of?
d. Which song did the DJ say that the people at the club were too drunk to enjoy?
(29) a.*Which color have the designers voted that the clients would consider able?
b.*Which joke did the talkshow guests say the host would find it easy to excuse to?
c.*Which baker did the tenants ask whether the parking meters annoyed for?
d.*Which city did the cab companies determine if the parking spaces should be used?
To ensure that the propositions conveyed by relative clauses in the Parasitic gap items are plausible to begin with, a norming task was conducted on the declarative counterparts of the subjectembedded relative clauses. For example, the relative in (27a) was converted to the declarative clause in (30).
(30) The bystanders who witnessed this incident found it terrifying.
A group of 23 native English speakers were recruited through AMT to evaluate the plausibility of the 24 declarative counterparts of the relative clauses in the Parasitic gap type condition together with 15 plausible distractors such as (31a,b), 15 moderately plausible distractors like (31c,d), and 20 implausible distractors as in (31e,f). Raters were asked to use a 1 -7 Likert scale in order to 'rate the likelihood of the situations described by the sentences'.
(31) a. The lawyer wanted to convince this jury that his client was innocent. Mean responses were 5.6 (SD = 1.4) for the experimental items, 6.45 (SD = 0.88) for the plausible distractors, 2.51 (SD = 1.66) for the moderately plausible distractors, and 1.79 (SD = 1.41) for the implausible distractors. Pairwise t-tests comparing the means for the experimental items against the means of the plausible distractors, as well as against the means of the moderately plausible distractors were significant (against the plausible distractors: t = −8.91, p < 0.0001; against the moderately plausible distractors: t = 22.81, p < 0.0001), indicating that the plausibility of the relative clauses in the Parasitic gap type items lies in between the plausibility of our 'plausible' and 'moderately plausible' distractors. Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no plausibility norming across conditions in the present experiment. Consequently, the items are structurally and pragmatically complex in different ways across conditions, and therefore there should be no expectation that they are equally pragmatically or equally (un)acceptable either.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results
The mean responses for each of the three stimulus types were 4.26 (SD = 1.77) for Parasitic gap items, 5.46 (SD = 1.56) for Object gap items, and 2.67 (SD = 1.52) for Non-parasitic gap items. Note that if one adopts the same criterion as Phillips (2006, 808) , then the items in the Parasitic gaps condition should be automatically deemed grammatical, as their mean acceptability is above the middle of the scale. Finally, the mean response for the grammatical distractors was 5.21 (SD = 1.66), and for the ungrammatical distractors it was 2.99 (SD = 1.64).
To determine whether the mean acceptability responses were statistically different from each other across the three types of sentences, three pairwise LMER comparisons with construction type as a fixed predictor were conducted. All pairs were found to be significantly different (Parasitic gap vs. Object gap: β = 1.225, t = 14.47, p < 0.0001; Parasitic gap vs. Non-parasitic gap: β = −1.60, t = −18.9, p < 0.0001; Object gap vs. Non-parasitic gap: β = −2.836, t = −35.14, p < 0.0001). In order to determine if the acceptability of the experimental items increased during the experiment, LMER models with order of experimental presentation as a fixed predictor were used, analyzing each of the three construction types separately. Object gap items became increasingly more acceptable (β = 0.036, t = 4.1, p < 0.0001), and so did Parasitic gap items, only twice as fast (β = 0.062, t = 5.9, p < 0.0001), suggesting that the acceptability ratings of the two conditions converge, given enough presentations. Note that both kinds of items were relatively complex and so the acceptability increase likely reflects the effect of comprehenders adapting to them and becoming more proficient at processing such constructions. Finally, the acceptability ratings of Non-parasitic gap items did change (β = 0.014, t = 1.64, p = 0.1), perhaps because such sentences described less felicitous propositions because the extracted referent had no obvious bearing on the main predicate (see §2.2). Figure 4 shows the results, according to the experimental presentation order. As in Experiment 1, no two participants saw the same presentation order and each point corresponds to the mean rating according to presentation order.
Analogously to Experiment 1, a subset of the data was formed consisting of the last four presentation orders (83 responses). The mean acceptability was 5.72 (SD = 1.43) for Object gap condition items, and 4.86 (SD = 1.65) for Parasitic gap condition items. An LMER model was run on this subset of data with gap location as a fixed predictor, and found it to be significant (β = 0.73, t = 2.64, p = 0.01). However, focusing on a smaller window consisting of the last two presentation orders (35 responses), the mean acceptability of the Parasitic gap condition was 4.65 (SD = 1.66), and the mean acceptability for the Object gap condition was 5.6 (SD = 1.29). An LMER model with construction type as a fixed predictor found no significant difference (β = 0.53, t = 1.52, p = 0.148), as Figure 5 illustrates. Given the concerns raised by such a small sample size, we adopted the same bootstrapping approach employed in Experiment 1 and sampled with replacement from the 35 total data points (17 per condition) to create 1118 data points (559 per condition). This process was repeated 100 times, and for each upsampled dataset an LMER model was ran with gap location as a fixed predictor, allowing the random effects to have different slopes for the main factor. The results were again not significant (mean t = 0.62, SD = 0.04). Finally, as in Experiment 1, we compared the acceptability ratings of Parasitic gap items that were seen by participants at the end of the experiment with an equal number of Object gap items seen in the beginning of the experiment, by forming a subset of our data consisting of 72 type Parasitic gap responses whose presentation orders were 18 or higher and of 72 type Object gap responses whose presentation order was either 1 or 2. The mean response for the Parasitic condition was 4.88 (SD = 1.75), and the mean response for the Object gap condition was 5.15 (SD = 1.51). Again, construction type was not significant (β = 0.343, t = 1.35, p = 0.17), suggesting that the acceptability of Parasitic gap items by the end of the experiment was not significantly different from the acceptability of Object gap items at the beginning of the experiment. The above results suggest that tense-embedded subject-internal parasitic gaps can be deemed as acceptable as uncontroversially grammatical sentences, in ideal conditions. 
Discussion
The acceptability of Parasitic gap items increased twice as fast Object gap items during the experiment. We suspect these results were caused by comprehenders becoming more proficient at processing such complex sentences. Future research is needed to determine whether Non-parasitic gap items are truly immune to frequency effects, or simply harder to ameliorate, perhaps for the reasons outlined in §2.2. Nonetheless, our results suggest that sentences with tense-embedded parasitic subject gaps can be rated as acceptable as grammatical counterparts, given enough exposure. Our findings are therefore consistent with the view that speakers can overcome their prior expectations about where gaps are usually located if such sentences express highly plausible propositions to begin with. If the acceptability of Subject Island violations is sensitive to the probability of the filler-gap dependency in the particular sentence and context, as argued by Hofmeister et al. (2013) , then it makes sense that different experiments and/or different Subject Island violation items can lead to different results. Experiment 4 provides on-line evidence that comprehenders do in fact actively postulate subject-internal gaps within such tensed relative clauses, contra Phillips (2006).
Experiment 4: Gap-filling in tensed subject phrases
Past research on gap filling in subject-embedded tensed relatives is inconclusive. Clifton and Frazier (1989) manipulated the verb inside relative clauses in a speeded acceptability experiment so that the latter could be an optionally transitive verb as in (32a) or an obligatorily intransitive verb as in (32b). The relevant subject phrase is bracketed for perspicuity. Speakers took a longer time to judge the former, suggesting the postulation of a gap inside the subject-embedded relative, but as Phillips (2006) notes, this may simply reflect readers' uncertainty over the argument structure of the optionally transitive verb. Similarly, Experiment 1 of Pickering et al. (1994) probed sentences like (33) and found a slowdown in reading time at the tensed relative clause verb, painted, rather than at the complement the large mural. Although this finding is consistent with the formation of a long-distance dependency in which there is a gap in the subject-embedded relative clause, Pickering et al. (1994) concede that the slowdown may simply reflect overall processing load at that region of the sentence. To resolve this impasse, Phillips (2006, 807-814) conducted a semantic plausibility self-paced reading experiment which suggests that comprehenders attempt to resolve filler-gap dependencies in subject-embedded infinitival verb phrases (i.e. comprehenders postulated a gap after expand in (34a) when the filler phrase was compatible with the relative verb), but make no such attempt in subject-embedded tensed verb phrases (i.e. gaps were never postulated after expanded in (34b)).
(34) a. The school superintendent learned which schools / which high school students the proposal to expand drastically and innovatively upon the current curriculum would overburden during the following semester.
b. The school superintendent learned which schools / which high school students the proposal that expanded drastically and innovatively upon the current curriculum would overburden during the following semester.
Given these results, Phillips (2006, 803) concludes that the language processor does not postulate gaps in subject-embedded tensed structures because such gaps are grammatically illicit, parasitically or otherwise. However, the argument that parasitic gaps in subject-embedded tensed structures are illicit is undermined by the existence of counterexamples like (26) above, and by the results of our Experiment 3. We conjecture that the comprehenders in Phillips (2006) did not attempt to postulate subject-internal gaps in tensed environments like (34b) because of a flaw in the experimental items. At least 8 out of 24 items (over 30%) in the tensed and plausible conditions used in Phillips (2006) actually contained semantically infelicitous critical regions. This becomes obvious if we focus on Phillips' relative clauses, and simply 'undo' the extraction. For example, in the plausible condition in (34b), the noun phrase becomes the proposal that expanded the schools, which is semantically felicitous. Unfortunately, this was not the case for several of the experimental items. In (35) we list some problematic noun phrases drawn from the critical regions of the plausible conditions used in Phillips (2006, 820) . (35) (35a) is bizarre in the tensed condition because request is not a suitable agent for the verb ask. In contrast, the infinitival counterpart is felicitous because to ask the question is a complement of request. In other words, not only do the tensed and the non-tensed counterparts have different meanings, the former are severely deviant. The same objection can be raised for all the other phrases listed in (35) . All the experimental items should have been equally felicitous in both the infinitival and the tensed conditions, but because more than half of the items in the tensed condition were odd (at least 12 were odd because the filler phrase was implausible, and at least 8 were odd as seen in (35)), it is possible that comprehenders adapted to the near-systematic oddness of the sentences in the tensed condition and simply refrained from attempting to fill gaps in that condition. If the source of extraction is defective, then the result is at least as defective. Below we show that comprehenders can in fact postulate subject-internal gaps in tensed relatives during on-line sentence processing, using the same paradigm of Phillips (2006).
Methods
Participants
We analyzed data provided by 30 participants who were recruited in AMT, using recruitment protocols identical to Experiment 1. All had accuracy levels of at least 80% in comprehension questions, with a mean accuracy level of 87%. There were 11 additional participants whose accuracy scores were lower than the 80% threshold. Data collected from these participants were discarded.
Design and materials
We constructed 20 pairs of experimental sentences like the two pairs shown in (36) and (37). See Appendix D for a complete list. Each pair of items differed in the semantic plausibility of the extracted phrase in region 1 as a filler for a potential gap at the end of the relative clause in region 7. For example, whereas the noun bill is a semantically plausible complement for to pass, the noun table is not. Region 10 contained the grammatically correct object of the verb in region 7, and region 11 corresponded to the main verb of the clause.
(36) a. Thus, the critical regions of interest were regions 7 through 11. If comprehenders attempt to resolve the filler-gap dependency at region 7, inside a subject-embedded tensed relative clause, then there should be a slowdown in reading time when the filler phrase is a semantically implausible complement for the verb at region 7. The adverbs at regions 8 and 9 were designed to delay and maximize the possibility of linking the extracted phrase to the object of the verb at region 7. Crucially, the adverbs are temporarily compatible with a parse in which they modify an upcoming main verb phrase, illustrated in (38a), or an upcoming complement, as in (38b). Although the latter is the correct parse for the adverbs in our experimental items, this is a rather infrequent and therefore dispreferred use of such adverbs, though perfectly grammatical and attested in corpora. 14 (38) a. Crucially, the verbs at region 7 are strongly transitive, and as is well-known, gaps tend to be postulated after strongly transitive verbs even if they are implausible and even before there is direct evidence for a missing object (Stowe et al., 1991) . But if comprehenders postulate a gap at region 7 in the implausible condition, gap-filling fails because the filler is not a plausible object for the verb. As a consequence, the presence of the adverbs in region 8 and 9 will be rather unexpected precisely because such adverbs are typically used as verb phrase modifiers, and there should be additional processing difficulty in the adverbial regions. No extra difficulty should arise in the plausible condition because the adverbs are consistent with an upcoming main verb phrase parse. Finally, note that region 7 always consisted of a 'purpose' infinitival VP adjoined to the tensed VP heading the relative. Thus, any gap postulated at region 7 crosses a total of three classic 'barriers' to extraction: modification, tense, and a subject phrase.
To ensure that there is a difference in plausibility between the plausible and implausible versions of each experimental sentence pair, a norming study was conducted in which a separate group of 53 native English speakers recruited through AMT were asked to evaluate the propositions expressed by the relative clauses of our items. For example, the two conditions in (36a) were used to produce the declaratives in (39). Participants were then asked to rate the plausibility of such sentences, using a 1-7 Likert scale, with 1 being 'very implausible', and 7 being 'very plausible'. Pairwise t-tests revealed a significant plausibility difference for all pairs (all p's < 0.05).
(39) a. The senators attended the meeting to pass a bill.
(plausible)
b. The senators attended the meeting to pass a table.
After the norming study, the experimental sentence pairs were counterbalanced across two lists so that each participant only responded to one version of each sentence. Experimental sentences were interspersed among 50 distractor items, and the experiment was presented in a different random order for each participant. Distractors were of four types, as illustrated in (40), half of which were followed by (non-trivial) comprehension questions, also shown in (40). The first type of distractor, exemplified in (40a), consisted of a complex interrogative in which the gap is deeply embedded in a clausal complement of the matrix. The second type of distractor, seen in (40b), consisted of a standard parasitic gap interrogative construction in which one gap is a complement of the subject nominal and the second gap is embedded in the matrix verb phrase. The third type of distractor consisted of declarative clauses with a demonstrative subject and a complex relative clause embedded in the complement phrase, as in (40c). The fourth and final type of distractor consisted of a declarative-embedded interrogative, as in (40d). As in previous experiments, the distractors were homogenous and therefore can act as additional controls.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2.
Results
For each region of interest, reading times less than 100 ms and more than 1,500 ms long were excluded, and data points greater or less than 2.5 standard deviations from each participants mean were replaced with these boundary values. Residual reading times were computed as in Experiment 2. An LMER model was used to test whether the residual reading times for all sentence regions were affected by the plausibility of the filler phrase. Mean residual reading times are in Figure 6 . The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. There was a main effect of plausibility at the verb region 7 (β = −26.94,t = −2.037, p = 0.042), indicating that participants read the infinitival verb phrase more slowly when the filler was an implausible gap-filler at that verb's region (mean 437 ms, SD = 205) than when the filler was a plausible gap-filler at that same region (mean 411 ms, SD = 229). There was no significant effect of plausibility at region 8 (β = −13.63,t = −0.977, p = 0.329), but at region 9 there was again a main effect of plausibility (β = −38.35,t = −3.397, p = 0.0007), in which participants again slowed down in the implausible filler phrase condition only (mean 462 ms, SD = 203 vs. 422 ms, SD = 183). No other regions before 7 or after 9 registered any significant effects.
Discussion
The results suggest that comprehenders postulated a gap at region 7, given that the items in the implausible filler phrase condition lead to a significant increase in reading time at that region. As already noted above, gaps tend to be postulated after strongly transitive verbs even if they are implausible and even before there is direct evidence for a missing object (Stowe et al., 1991) . If comprehenders postulate a gap at region 7 in the implausible condition, then gap-filling fails because the filler is a semantically implausible object for the verb. And after failing to fill it because of its implausibility, comprehenders come to expect the verbs true object. However, they instead encounter adverbs that are most consistent with an upcoming main verb phrase, and therefore the slowdown at region 9 only arises in the implausible condition.
In sum, our findings suggest that comprehenders can postulate gaps in subject-embedded tensed relatives, contrary to the null effects found by Phillips (2006) in an analogous experiment. We hypothesize that the latter was caused by semantically infelicitous tensed items. The fact that active gap filling sometimes occurs in subject-embedded tensed phrases, and sometimes does not, is consistent with the hypothesis that the on-line processing of filler-gap dependencies is modulated by extra-grammatical factors, such as probabilistic information about the expected distribution of gaps, given the semantics and pragmatics of the items.
General Discussion
Following Erteschik-Shir (1981), Van Valin (1986) , Kuno (1987) , Takami (1992) , Deane (1992) and others, we assume that extraction is in general restricted to the informational focus of the proposition. As a consequence, extraction from subject phrases should be difficult given that subjects are typically reserved for topic continuity, and subject-embedded referents are unlikely to be the informational focus of the utterance. This conclusion is independently supported by corpus data showing that attested Subject Island violations invariably involve relative clauses that describe new information rather than background information, and that complex NPs tend to be objects rather than subjects.
Our hypothesis is that if the entire proposition is highly pragmatically felicitous, then the mention of its embedded referents must be highly felicitous too, even if subject-embedded. If the mention of a given referent (subject-embedded of not) is highly felicitous, it is more likely for such a referent to be understood as the informational focus, and thus easier for it to be extracted. This is consistent with the intuition expressed by Kluender (2004, 495) , Shimojo (2002) , and Chaves (2013) that Subject Island violations tend to be more acceptable when the extracted referent is relevant for the main assertion. More generally, in order for the mention of a referent to be felicitous and in accordance to the Gricean Maxims of Quantity ('Be brief') and Manner ('Avoid Prolixity'), the context must be such that the referent is not irrelevant for the proposition. As we show, because subjects tend to be topics, subject-embedded referents are rarer than object-embedded referents, even without extraction.
According to our findings, ensuring that a proposition with subject-embedded referents is highly felicitous to begin with suffices to induce the extractability of such subject-embedded referents, if their frequency is increased. Our results are most consistent with the functional approach proposed by Hofmeister et al. (2013) and Chaves (2013) in which the more syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically plausible the subject-internal gap, the more acceptable such extractions should be, especially if comprehenders have the chance to adjust to the unusual syntactic location of the gap by being exposed to multiple exemplars of such sentences. We argue that such amelioration is facilitated when the very mention of the subject-embedded referent is a highly felicitous discourse move to begin with. Such an account also explains why a subject-embedded gap often becomes acceptable 'parasitically' if co-indexed with a non-island gap: since the extracted referent is an argument of the main predicate, it is trivially relevant for the main assertion. Our account is also consistent with the findings of Polinsky et al. (2013) , which suggests that Subject Island violations in transitive predicates tend to be stronger than in unaccusatives. If the subject is an agent or an actor, it initiates or controls the event, and is by default more relevant for the assertion than any subject-embedded referent. However, if the subject is not an agent or actor, then it is easier for a phrase other than the subject to be construed as relevant, including a subject-embedded referent. Thus, it is not easy to extract from subjects of transitive verbs, though not impossible; see Chomsky (2008 , 160,ft.39), Jiménez-Fernández (2009 ), and Chaves (2013 . Ultimately, Subject Island effects are likely proposition-dependent, and in particular, contingent on the degree to which the subject-embedded referent is relevant for the assertion.
The present account of Subject Island effects also requires no special assumptions to explain the behavioral phenomena. It is well-known that speakers generally attend to frequencies in linguistic input, and can adapt to changes in order to overcome the processing difficulty caused when the input is unusual and inconsistent with their prior experience. In particular, comprehenders make use of expectations about the distribution of filler-gap dependencies to efficiently prune the search space during gap detection, mitigating the processing costs associated with resolving such dependencies during on-line sentence comprehension (van Schijndel et al., 2014; Michel, 2014) . We conclude that linguistic theory need not be complicated by constraints that block extraction from subjects, as the behavioral phenomena are graded, fluid and thus likely functional in nature. 
